And here's the rest

...

Some definitions describe knowledge with the use of the term awareness, but our awareness can be in error, just like our senses/perception (such as when we receive sensory input that there turns out to more likely not to have a cause we're used to attributing it to like phantom vibrations, or lapse in sight or hearing), reasoning (errors or contextual mistakes that lead to an “erroneous” conclusion or next phase of reason or action), memory (memory is already considered highly fallible, with one operative function being that when we remember something after the first time we tend to build or recall the memory based on previous builds and recalls of the same memory), practice (doing something wrong without realizing it), inquiry (errors in the manner, considerations, and execution into an investigation), etc (and it's already been established that there is a distinction between the two, with knowledge appearing more binary and awareness being more open-ended). They can also be described with reference to understanding, but there are also plenty of instances in which one may be confident and solidified in an understanding and it be a misunderstanding, which indicates falsity, and knowledge has already be established as necessary to be true. Point being, this doesn't seem to constitute “knowledge” in a truly cohesive way, though will invariably be linked to knowledge when knowledge is actually possessed.

With some of the examples above we have covered some common forms of knowledge: procedural (“knowledge” of skills and processes), descriptive (“knowledge” of facts and information), acquaintance (“knowledge” of persons, places, and things), and tacit (information learned unconsciously or subconsciously).

Another scheme for classifying knowledge, that is a bit more binary, discerns between a posteriori (knowledge gained from sense experience) and a priori (knowledge gained by understanding a system, often related to some abstraction, such as the definition of words).

There's a philosophical camp that asserts there's information that one just knows (innate knowledge). All other problematic mentions aside, what about the same sense to be had in matters where we were wrong and we thought that we just knew? I can see us having an innate capacity for what we call knowledge, but can't align myself with the idea that some things we just know...

With regard to our own thoughts, I will concede that we perhaps know some of the contents of our own thoughts. It was Descarte who paradoxically affirmed the existence of his own mind by attempting to deny it. Simply, he found a rationale for how he could be wrong about the existence of the outside world and items in it, including his own body. Once he arrived at his own mind he deduced that it must exist for it has to in order to be able to attempt to deny its own existence. He then went on to concede to knowing the contents of his own thoughts. My only distinction is that I'm not sure any individual can know the full contents of all of their thoughts... do we not seem to learn things about ourselves and our thinking often (at least if we're paying attention)?

Intuition seems to be more of a sense than it is a faculty of mind, appearing to need the same interaction with mind as sense data from sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell.

And instinct seems to almost be biological rather than of a mental faculty, being centered more on innate response to potentially increase chances of survival.

Learning doesn't seem to constitute knowledge. Learning seems more so centered around the acquisition and manipulation of information, regardless of being true or false. Potentially false information is likely “learned” all the time in any given paradigm and identified by the paradigms own parameters.

Our minds appear to make shortcuts in how it uses information in order to filter and save us time. These mental shortcuts are called heuristics or cognitive biases. When these are left unchecked and we are unaware of them, the mechanisms can often lead us to erroneous conclusions in many contexts. And they seem prevalent at almost every level of thought since they arise from the subconscious. Thus, they get in the way in regards to what we know, if we know.

Again, if no one knows everything and no one is right all the time, then we all have false beliefs and not just about things perceived as unverifiable, but in matters where we can employ a system for some sort of verification as well.

Considering the above as well as the post about assumptions we can see how the matter regarding knowledge seems to come down to a felt sense. So is it more apt to say that we feel we know, than simply that we know?

If there's anything we can/do know, the size of such a class is quite possibly a great deal smaller than we would like to think...

So, I'm still wondering, how do we know what we know when we know (if we can)? Or do we more often than not just think we know? Should we not keep in mind the abstract underpinnings to knowing and knowledge that perhaps make it more of an open-ended concept than how we presently treat and use it?

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Really?

That is my reduction of the topic and I mean it in jest.

I dig it though, I question a lot but it isn't some type of naysaying faith based denial that gets called skepticism these days.

Like calling an atheist a skeptic, atheism is a faith based claim that something does not exist, thus it is not skeptical at all, rather it is anti-theistic and is just another type of faith no less absurd than that of the believer.

To me atheists are just another type of religious fanatic who don't have the courage to say those three special and sacred words:

"I don't know"

I had to edit this to add:
Have you read Of Grammatology?
My mind went there when reading this thread, though likely just through association and not in a responsive way.

I read the majority of the thread but much of the material was surprisingly familiar and I didn't spend too much time on it.

I do not consider myself a skeptic, rather I tend to dislike modern approaches to it, however according to the function of skepticism outlined in this work I am a skeptic.

I once said; Paradox is the Basis of Reality.

I also maintain opposing beliefs as tenable, regardless of their mutual exclusivity. As an example let us say I find a dollar just sitting around. It could have been placed there on purpose or it could have fallen by accident, those two possibilities are mutually exclusive yet both are tenable. Without more information I can assume they are both potentially true but I cannot assume they are both potentially false. But then nothing about that is inherently paradoxical, though it might feel that way to someone.

Speaking of paradox, you might like this paper I am attaching, it is about the Grandfather paradox.

You mentioned Buddhism and the Veda.
These inform my ontology as well.

Glad you were able to check it out.

One of the reasons I wrote it was for clarity; to distinguish this philosophic skepticism from the way the word happens to be used outside of a philosophical context, and to show what I find to be flaws in other forms of philosophic skepticism, such as positivist statements about not knowing.



On a lower (or higher, depending on how I'm structuring my mind for whatever recursive idea in question, ie, being sourced from (lower) versus superseding (higher)) level from my mode of skepticism, this is largely how I feel and see things.

Thank you for sharing the paper

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What you basically define as good skepticism here is what I tend to think of as being open minded and aware of the nature of belief as subjective, relative and subject to change.

I think this type of approach can be quite healthy.

You asked how I define reality.
I do not.

Reality existed before I did and will when I am no longer.
I am a part of it but it does not come from me.

Reality defines me, not the other way around, and it does so regardless of what I believe.

(as for the paper, it is considered mathematical proof that time travel is possible and is a fun discussion unto itself, but it also relates to this topic in a number of ways. Many people claim to know time travel is not possible but the math says otherwise)

In that case, how are you able to say that something is not real or real then? Kinda see where I'm going here?

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It's one thing to take things at face value. It's another to investigate. And yet another to ask “how could I be wrong,” or “how could x assertion be in error,” or “how could things not be as they seem (before or after investigation)?” The distinction between the second and third is that with the second there is more often than not an expectation for a “satisfactory” answer relative to the investigation, and certain axioms and assumptions are fully trusted, where as the third such an expectation is absent; the end answer pertinent to the investigation is not of consequence, but instead, and very simply, how could it not be the case. With respect to the “truth” about “reality” I feel there is no deeper truth than that which arises from our own honest reflections and more so than any assertion about the “external world.”

What happens when we chase this rabbit in a tuxedo down the hole...?

Doesn't almost any question seem to have certain presuppositions that substantiate and hold it together? Can questions not be asked with regard to any question in question? Does a question imply something is known by having the capacity to be asked (see problem of the criterion)? Does a question always presuppose an answer? How can we evaluate the potential value of a question that has no answer? How often is it the case that there is no answer versus the answer cannot be known? What do we do to parse the instances in which we think we know and are “unjustified” from when we think we know and are more “justified?” What is the best way of questioning faith-based claims? What is the best way of questioning rational, logical, and sense based claims, exclusively? Does arriving at some answer to a question always terminate further questioning?

Doubt, questioning, and query, while being defined as distinct individual elements of this thought structure, undoubtedly work in concert. Doubt could be said to be the frame and chassis of the structure with questioning being the functioning parts, and query being the specific operations that can be performed by the structure. Another way to look at it is that doubt is the overall “attitude” or “behavior,” while questioning can be looked at as the reasoning behind the query, which can be view as specific actions. More distinctly, doubt is the state of curious uncertainty, while the questioning is the specific questions, that if answered in some “satisfactory” way would alleviate and dissuade uncertainty or reveals a breeding ground for further questioning, and query being the specific mode used to employ said questions.

I have doubts about what we can know, which is not to make the mistake of making the positivist statement of “we cannot know anything,” or any statement of the like. And as we've seen, this doubt extends all the way to our systems of thought and the assumptions, presuppositions, and axioms that support them.

The “truth” always seems predicated on some system of thought employed (faith based modes, rational/logic based modes, and empirical modes). And each system seems to have limits and flaws, so what does that say about the conclusions the system draws?

To restate, the state of doubting is the groundwork or foundation. Because of doubt, questioning invariably arises (unless one is simply doubting without attempting any further investigation), which then lends itself to how a given topic is questioned. There's active and passive doubt: active doubt entails a certain sense of wonder, of which specific questions lead to specific query sets. Passive doubt relates more to the admission of not knowing and leads to the suspension of judgment (to be covered in the next section).

Hume is commonly referred to as an empiricist and Descarte as a rationalist. I view them both as skeptics at heart. They were both brought to their practice by doubt. As we've already seen, through active doubt, Descarte was able to cast said doubt upon everything in a manner that left knowing of the nature and existence of such things in limbo, aside from his own mind. He then later, realizing that some system was needed to operate in a questionable world, defaulted to rationalism; he felt that any core concept that anyone would want to know could be discovered by sitting quietly and alone and immersed in a rational process. Hume cast doubt on just about everything as well but in a different manner, positing upon even simple ideas like cause and effect. Simply, he stated that we don't actually have experience of cause and effect, but instead only one thing happening followed by another. He thought that there wasn't really a causal justification and that our minds fill that in. He thought that we perhaps see one thing happen followed by another, and that within the apparent consistency we believe there is a cause-effect relation. But really, it may be that the “system” is designed so that certain things follow after others, and through the operation of a “system” the events are not causing another but simply following after. At the end of the day though, also understanding that we need something at least to help us move forward in our investigations, defaulted to empiricism.

I consider both of the individuals to be active doubters; they wondered and explored in a fashion that gave us information about a variety of things, but without giving us any answer that we may want.

It's important to question our desires relative to what we want to know, what we think we know, and how we think we know. For example, could it be possible that we project a desire or expectation onto reality in a way where we initiate biases in order to arrive at a “satisfactory” answer? To elaborate, is it possible that we in many ways project a desire and preference of “order” onto reality in some magnitude or degree?

I would say that the conclusions we draw are well described as a picture of the subset of reality we are trying to explain and are not actually the thing being explained (similar to Wittgenstein). So how much do we know about said reality from said picture(s)?

Socrates on the other hand was a more passive doubter. He spent his time going around and showing people how they were wrong or may not know what they think they do in the ways they think they do. Socrates never really had any positivist theoretical insights to provide other than explicitly what one does not know in a given context or scenario. He admitted he knew nothing, so his approach was sort of grounded in, “I don't know anything, so how can you?”

With regard to questioning, some questions will be more apt than others. For our purposes, we will work with questions that have acute valid applicability; the question having a formulation that allows for an application with whatever is in question. While using the term “valid,” I don't mean so in the traditional manner used in logic to speak of form (argument form in logic, question form in this discussion), but more in line with the questions' placement in a given query. There are certain considerations to be made aptly. This sounds somewhat arbitrary, and it is; instead of being some precise “point,” it is instead a range in which the question nests itself in. Simply, “sloppy” questions are unfavorable; well thought questions are preferred. What is assumed by the nature of the question? What factors are relevant to the question and its outcome, whether that be an answer, lack of such, or indeterminacy?

Because of my skepticism, I feel that some of the best formulated questions arise from the framing of a conditional; If x is the case, then [question y]? There is an acknowledged loose presupposition at the onset, denoting that x may not necessarily be the case, but if it is... As an example (one I am choosing because it's easy); “If God is all good then why does he allow bad things to happen?” First, there's a presupposition that God does exist (something I'm not in any way trying to explore, but instead exploring what implicit assumptions are made through the essence of the question). Another is taking for granted our capacity to understand the action and reasoning of such a being as well as the assumption that what is considered “bad” to us would also seem so to God. There's also the act of ignoring not only the nature of the relationship between good and bad, but also the implications of our experience of things we consider good and bad and how we understand that experience and how we understand good and bad based on that experience. This is an unfavorable question lacking in acute valid applicability.

It takes a good deal of imagination.

The query is our journey of the deployment of the questions that arise as a result of our doubt. Skepticism is predicated on response to propositions without developing any propositions of its own; only conditional observations. So our query will utilize the next question in a set of options based on some response to a previous question. Practically, skepticism is a refinement process of held ideation on different topics. Epistemicaly, it challenges what we know and how, if at all. This means, that regardless of whatever thing is being investigated externally, one will almost always end up with doubts, questions, and queries about one's own senses mind, experience, and nature of such therein. We are the ones attempting to know; existence will be what it is regardless of what we think about it, and how accurate we are in what we claim to “know.” Reality doesn't seem to revolve around us.

If our memories, senses, sense of reason, intuition, etc, and connections between all of these faculties can be seen to be flawed, limited, and wrong more than we realize, then how is there anything that we “truly” know about the whole of reality? Sure we have repeatability as a source of verification for some things, but we seem to be biased by controlling the ways and manners in which we receive such information. Is it possible there's a lack of veracity in the implicit assumption that repeatability constitutes the “basis of reality.” Could our interpretations of such information be biased in a way that leads us to perceive repeatability? Could our discovering of repeatability, which we interpret as order, be the finding of random subsets of “order” in an overall chaotic system? Could one posit how it could be that somehow the “senses” and “faculties” that we use to arrive at certain conclusions not be based in “reality” at all?

One might respond with, “this isn't practical,” to which a skeptic using this framework could reply, “is it not an assumption, one that we need albeit, but may be in error, that reality is rational or practical?”

Besides, I stated a while ago I don't care about practicality in this matter

And none of this is to insinuate that reality is “relative,” “subjective” or otherwise, because on many “levels” that is not how it seems, and how it seems is all we have to go on it appears. Does it not appear that the whole of reality that we experience seems to have elements of seemingly objective phenomena, as well as relative, intersubjective, and subjective (the most inescapable of all), all permeating what could perhaps be called “layers” of reality? We tend to shrug off subjectivity in a lot of ways when it's convenient for us, but hold onto ours stringently when it benefits us; would it not be accurate to note that the subjective experience or reality of a single individual has an objective implication in the overall milieu of the world and reality, no matter how small? Does a fictional character not have a standing in some way to reality? I mean, Santa Clause is a pretty popular fellow, and though fictional, has impacted many parts of the world. Not just by affecting people's minds, but by extension; how people change the world based on this fictional character. A physical sculpture of Santa Claus is an alteration in the “physical” world based off the influence of a fictional character, it appears.

Could it be that different individuals are programmed to see certain things in certain ways (with the natural statistic of certain ways being more prevalent than others but not necessarily gleaning more information about what is reality and what we think we “know” about it)? Are our claims about what we claim to know steeped within the paradigm in which we happen to be thinking in, and delimited from reality by restrictions to such a paradigm? But then, how could we say what we know or what is known without some paradigm to work in and from? This last one is an example of why I feel it's an error to say “we can't know” (though there are some things we can certainly admit to not being able to know) or that something is wrong, because some mode of thought appears necessary in order to take that first step in claiming and substantiating “knowledge.”

This is something that is meant to be used to explore attempts at elimination of bias, so any knowledge claim can be dissected, such as a claim for something being real or claim for something not being real; it goes both ways.

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Nothing escapes the predation of questioning and query; everything comes under the magnifying glass of scrutiny, from our assumptions (primal building blocks) to our conclusions (the structure). Since nothing is off limits, our convictions also get scrutinized, fully exploring as many facets and factors as possible (as we are limited).

With this application, attempting avoidance of bias and appeal (for bias seems to detract us from "truth" if there is such a thing to be “known”) and in consideration of the wide range of views and positions held (for almost any given topic there is a debate of the “truth of the matter” at some level; and for a given topic, different individuals can/will employ a disparate variety or permutations of thought systems for understanding, mechanisms for reasoning and thinking, and different standards of conviction to arrive at the “truth” of said topic), a special kind of arbitrariness or "emptiness" can be observed (notice, this is not a claim that things are empty, but its something that can be perceived; for all we know there's paradoxical polyvalency to things, so something can have have emptiness as a major aspect as well as content as a major aspect, or it could just be based on and steeped in perspective (further calling into question the nature of “truth,” with considerations such as the potentiality that “truth” is something mutable and based on the perspective taken in a given context on a given topic)); we position ourselves "on the line."

We enter a point in which the “world” is viewed through a varied lenses of hypotheticals, and explore the defining characteristics and claims through in-depth thought experiments that are predicated and built by hypotheticals that are take for granted on the surface of what is being explored.

Hm, emptiness... how Buddhist (more on this later).

How much of what we think we know is merely belief that we hope reflects reality (though many people seem to believe things more out of convenience and comfort)?

Throughout such a process, we end up outside of needing or having a position (as the need can be seen as its own kind of bias) which leads us nicely into a mental and epistemic free-fall and to the next format of skepticism: suspension of judgment.

A final note: Skepticism is just as concerned with “truth” as much as any positivist method of philosophic investigation, but is a bit more in depth and brutal about the endeavor by questioning the ontological nature of the idea of “truth;” does it even exist at all outside of a subjective/intersubjective framework? And unlike many other methods, skepticism is fine with the ideas that there may not be “truth” in the ways we think, that it may not exist at all, that we may never come to a conclusion in this method of investigation, and the possibility that nothing can be known; it remains suspended.

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Now that we've acknowledged the observed detracting nature of bias and assumption from "truth," we apply ourselves to not having any biases or assumptions (aside from the bias against bias and the assumption against assumptions ) as much as possible. As such, and following from, any assertions, claims or judgments we make will appeal to bias and assumption. So where does that leave us? Suspending judgment (especially absolute and/or definite judgments). In this philosophy of skepticism, judgment is relegated to claims, assertions, and arguments concerning knowledge and/or something being known. It does not preclude open statements, with inherent consideration and conceit towards potential limit or error (so, the framing and prose) in observation and belief. It allows for less weight and mental gripping to what is thought to be known and believed, making “changing one's mind” to more “accurate” measures easier. Despite potentially not knowing, we still seem to live lives and have occurrences in our immediate experience all the time.

Otherwise, we end up with stories and myths like that of Pyrrho, of whom stories are told where he was able to be so skeptical that he would walking in front of carriages without looking, almost walk off of ledges, and was able to have an intense surgery without anesthesia because of his uncertainty about if he was actually feeling any pain or not and if pain was even a thing to be felt.

There is both a practical application here as well as a more extreme application that appeals to things in a more “honest” way.

I would like to make a distinction in the realm of belief. We've already seen how belief is inherent to knowing, but there's also belief of unverifiables; interpretations of ancient things, religion, the nature of things we cannot systematically explore, things we can't double check, superstition, etc.

Belief revolves around and is concerned with the acceptance of something being the case or true. It is our trust and faith in something.

One believes they know x and/or knows they believe x.

One can believe something without knowing it, but one cannot know something and not believe for it's inherent to knowing to believe that which is thought to be known.

In our previous discussion around axioms and assumptions wherein we talked about the implicit nature of faith, the same can be said for belief.

It's also linked to our idea of conviction: many beliefs are held so tightly, including our ideas and beliefs in what we think/feel we know.

Belief outside of knowledge is a much looser type of concept despite our behaviors with it and why we aren't satisfied with just belief in discerning truth, and hence why we have the concept of knowledge.

A distinction we can make between the two is the positions held in regards to each. Typically our statements around what is known tend to emanate from more rigorous standards, whereas belief for many people doesn't entail a reasoning or justification and when it does it may (likely) be diminished in rigor and veracity.

Since we have been questioning knowledge this whole time, and we see how knowledge entails belief, it's accurate to say that our pursuit of knowledge is an attempt, but we never escape the nature of belief just like we never escape faith in these matters, so if we know anything, its may not be as concrete as we may think.

So to revisit, should our beliefs not reflect what we feel is true? Even if there's no way to verify?

The idea of “it was once known” is always kind of funny to me. If, as we've seen, stating a statement or argument as something that is known it is also to be true. However if it was once known but isn't because it was an error then it was never known it was something that was held as a belief with vehement conviction.

To state whats been stated before, if no one knows everything and no one is right all the time, then we all have beliefs (some of which we'd call knowledge) that are in error that are unbeknownst to us.
We seem to often choose to believe some things in certain ways as a way to fill in arbitrary gaps in understanding that an individual may feel is necessary to have some conclusion on in order to continue moving forward in some manner or other. Again, itt's concurrent with what we've covered with respect to faith.

Another difference we can observe between knowledge and belief is the degree of appeal to "consensus" reality... Things that are considered known often appeal to a larger subset than most things that are relegated to belief alone.

It also seems that many generate a belief and try to justify and support it as opposed to critically assessing whether they feel it's something that should be believed or not. Kind of the opposite of what would seem more appropriate to approach "truth"...

Some beliefs also seem to be derived more out of preference and convenience than as a potential framework that reflects reality (confirmation bias), such as upbringing, which is just a manner in which one is conditioned to think in certain ways, but none of those ways may lead to knowledge or knowing; rather instead, a set of beliefs and positions that one uses to move forward in reality while potentially (and likely) not reflecting things "true" about it.

Regardless, people seem to often generally draw conclusions from beliefs on varying degrees and layers of applicability in a given context and/or situation. In this regard, suspension of judgment is viewed as even more important.

I sometimes ask people why they're convinced by "x" which often upsets people, but it helps us to see more of why we think what we think and how we try to impose these thoughts on reality through the beliefs we generate about reality from said positions. A conviction in and of itself is not knowledge, though any "knowledge" held one should be convinced of (provided it such knowledge "exists".

Belief is not knowledge, though anything claimed as "knowledge" is thus believed.

We can see why my personal position is devoid of belief and conviction in many fundamental and core ways; they're mutable and loose, if extant at all. I entertain concepts and ideas critically.

It seems apt to approach truth about the world through honesty with ourselves, which leads to unknowing due to faults in our overall approach and desire by acknowledging in what ways we may or seem to compromise the truth in order to find the truth; "truth" seems predicated on looking at things from all angles, which includes looking at how our systems generate information that we want, as well as their potential faults errors and shortcomings. In short, seeing how we could be wrong/in error despite appearance of a given situation or the appearance of accuracy in the approach to assessing and interpreting a given situation.

By observing these apparent fundamental faults in deriving knowledge and the nature of belief, there's a seeming uncertainty about truth-hood and our position relative to it. We suspend our judgment.

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I'm questioning myself in how I wrote this a bit, but wanted to get it out there to you all.

This concept is stated simply enough, but putting it into practice is another story...

We're at a point where we can readily and honestly admit to ourselves that we do not know (notice I did not say that "we cannot 'know'"), but can also admit that there are many conceptual structures and paradigms that generate information of various kinds in various manners, some (perhaps even many) of which aim to be knowledge, claim to be knowledge, or claim to have knowledge derived from them.

In interacting with these paradigms, bearing in mind our admission to ourselves, we simply shed our preconceived notions (using skepticism as it has been laid out here to do so), and jump into whatever paradigm we are curious about exploring. However, we don't just jump in, rather, we jump in with our tools of skepticism running in the background.

It's important to make sure that skepticism is put in the background for otherwise one may miss out on fundamental axis points of understanding within a given paradigm. The approach here is having an understanding of the topic before exploring it through skepticism; skepticism comes at the beginning in the removal of any bias and opinion of the topic on the onset, and then thereafter when we look to explore its nature and understand the underpinnings of axioms and assumptions that make it "work."

This type of approach is phenomenological (hence the term "phenomenological skepticism), and predicated on understanding more so than "knowing," and as such, as one engages in this way, while immersed, there's little criticism or invalidation. One saves that until a time when one is removed from said immersion. Be in the moment.

This can leave one in a state of limbo, on the edge, on the fence, etc. about many things, covering all faceted sides, but having a potential higher degree and magnitude of understanding in general. It's not about dichotomies or binary distinctions such as right/wrong, correct/incorrect, etc, though these kinds of dichotomies can be entertained; we transcend them when immersed in the phenomenological experience. Thus, aptly and appropriately suspending our judgment becomes a key component to our overall approach: when and where should judgment be suspended?

In applying this practice repeatedly across many different paradigm structures, the mind gains a different breadth, engendering the mind to hold, appeal to, and understand through ideas such as polyvalency and paradox within considerations of disparate paradigms.

"Beliefs" may become "sticky" and "tricky" as a result of this practice, but awareness in general invariably broadens and paradoxically becomes more specific.

Jump in, the water's fine

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Well, I think we're coming up on the end of sorts (only 2-3 more posts), though I have a feeling I may share adjunct notes later.

I'm thankful. This was something that I didn't think I could do. I actually almost gave up a couple times. However, I composed the majority of these posts much quicker than I thought I could or would.

However, I don't think it turned out bad and is a good schematic for refining the overall idea. I used this forum as a way to explore how to share this idea.

So, thanks to all of you, in a couple years hopefully, I intend on polishing this up in a manner that is more in-depth and polished and will see if I can get it published, just because.

My gratitude goes out to you, whoever you may be. I truly hope you've enjoyed.



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Thanks to DF0 for this wonderful video that I hope you all enjoy



Next post will be up before the end of the month. Been pretty busy and thinking a lot.

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Was trying to find a good video on Tarski's Undefinability Theorem which shows the limits of finding truth in formal systems (particularly arithmetic).



But I couldn't find one I liked...

So, here's a little Godel instead. He does have another theorem that's related to Tarski's, but his Inconpleteness Theorem has far reaching implications for any formal system (even outside mathematics, expanded on by Hofstadter). This doesn't really concern informal systems because they are not expected or intended to be complete or consistent in that they use less rigor in the operation...

I wished the video would've talked a little more from the vantage of completeness, but all good.

Anyway, hope you enjoy.

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Something's better than nothing. Sorry it's taken so long. Enjoy



In my exploration and development of this idea (and the component ideas that make up the general complex of this idea) I couldn't help but notice how it appeals to certain other modalities of thought, such as Buddhism and Stoicism (to be fair, my modality as I've shared it both appeals to and defies/contradicts almost every other modality in various ways, as a fundamental mode of paradox, that is necessary and sufficient for its function; that said, the modalities of thought in which some comparisons will be drawn are done so based off of a perceived strength of connection).

We'll briefly observe these two philosophies and focus on how some specific elements of them run parallel to and have appeals with skepticism.

"Nothing is as it seems... nor is it otherwise."
"All is Maya (illusion/delusion)."

Both of these are statements made out of Buddhism (derived from Hinduism, only certain senses are different in Buddhism, such as the anthropomorphization in Hinduism versus the mental/phenomenal nature in Buddhism). They obviously have an essence of skepticism (and to revisit, the only "issue" I take with them is that, as they are, they are positivist statements, which means they also fall under their own scope and the idea they represent can also be applied to them through self reference, ie if all is Maya, the what does that say about the statement that "all is Maya" as well as the faculty (that is also part of the "all" ) that allows one to arrive at this conclusion? That said, the only thing I'd add to remedy this is that it seems that all is Maya), so, while skepticism may help one address bias, I am nevertheless biased towards skepticism as a whole and so these sentiments have a very strong appeal.

Nothing is as it seems... nor is it otherwise [It seems nothing is as it seems... nor does it seem to be otherwise]

We've visited what faults can be observed within our faculties, both sensory and cognitive; for we have to deal with limited amount of sensory data we receive based on inherent thresholds of sensitivity (our senses seem to never give us the full picture). What's funny is we have to still put some level of trust in our senses to be able to observe such (as well as our reason, logic, and rationality) We can also observe the nature of our own cognitive biases and heuristics, which while pertinent in their function at creating mental shortcuts for us unconscious to our immediate awareness, also lead us down routes of poor reasoning and conclusion forming, giving the idea of knowing anything.

To be skeptical in this way is to be mindful., for one seems to necessarily be skeptical of what is derived from one's own mind.

Senses and cognitive biases aside, there also seems to be the ways in which we are conditioned to think that underpins the mechanisms by which we form some conclusions, some of which go unchallenged in one's mind.

To restate: The first things that one learns tend to be the last things that one questions.

One of the main goals of Buddhism is the cessation from attachment: non-attachment. When one is unable to specify what they can know or do know, what then do they have to be attached to? Point being there is a kind of liberation to be found in this practice of skepticism. Once we detach ourselves from the need to know anything and find solace in that we may very well not know, then we have also removed our attachment to “everything else” to some degree.

The intent stated within Buddhism behind non-attachment is to aid as a component in ameliorating our suffering in conjunction with other tenets. If we are able to stifle our needs to know some, are we not freeing ourselves from certain burdens and certain suffering? Certainly, we want to have a what we feel is a good awareness of things in the “world” in order to feel that we can better guide the trajectories of our lives. However, do we not seem to be preoccupied with such endeavors to a degree that removes us from ourselves? And can it not be observed that some merely swing too far on the pendulum in the other direction trying to be as blind as possible fearing the implications and feelings of what they feel they may come to know?

Perhaps there's no greater illusion than the illusion that we "know" anything... and nothing greater to be attached to.

To be continued...

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All (or everything) is Maya. (It seems that All (or everything) is Maya or: It seems that All (or everything) may be Maya).

The term Maya has many different interpretations and meanings depending on the “school of thought” and context it is used in. Overall, most of these interpretations and meanings associate and attach themselves to ideals and frameworks relating to the appearance of things as opposed to their “true nature” (relative to whatever is considered “real” or “true” to the relative school of thought using the term).

As a broad Vedic interpretation, it is the illusion of the phenomenal world being real and actual when it cannot be for it is ever changing. According to this philosophy, only Brahman, the Absolute, which is unchanging and inviolable, is the only thing of true substance and action and as such is the only thing that is real, or even the only reality.

In Buddhism it is an idea part of a complex of unproductive (to the pursuit of liberation) mental functions and processes (20 Secondary Unwholesome Mental Factors), related to deception and concealment into the nature of reality on varying levels and in varying degrees. Due to the perspective that “everything” we seem to experience is fleeting and impermanent, including our perceived experience of what is appearing to be fleeting and impermanent, then its an illusion (or delusion in some interpretations) and the illusion progresses according to certain laws and standards of causation within the manifold of the illusion. Some Buddhists however may say that not even Maya exists...

The parallels here can be found in the related underlying observations made in both skepticism and philosophies that observe the concept of Maya. While with the skeptical position that has been provided, making explicit claims seems appropriate to avoid, however the essence of some of those aforementioned are nevertheless considered within this skeptical framework.

For the sake of simplicity, brevity, and move closer to understanding some of these connections, we'll focus a bit more on the Buddhist interpretation first. And, again, this isn't about whether said perspectives that align with skepticism are right or wrong, but that they have strong connection and appeal to skeptical currents of thought. A skeptic in this paradigm will not say that nothing exists (for it's an assertion as if it is known to be “true;” though, if nothing exists, then how can “truth” exist, and if truth doesn't exist then what does that say about the nature of the statement “nothing exists?”) but rather consider that (and how) it might be the case. Especially considering that one has already admitted they, potentially, and very well, may not know (reasons aside), then in a certain way the “unknown” is subjectively nonexistent because it isn't previously known to exist in the first place.

Another aspect that appeals to skepticism is the conceit that we certainly have an appearance of things, but that the appearance may not be the “reality” (or is not the true reality if adhering to a Hindu or Buddhist mode). Our beliefs can fall under this scope as well due to our beliefs not only being partly derived from the input of appearance, but also as a result of ways in which our minds seem to “jump to conclusions” as well as lead us to “false” conclusions. Again, this can be observed by functions such as cognitive biases and mechanisms that lead us to committing certain fallacies (perhaps common cognitive biases and fallacies committed would be a helpful future post).

I've said for a long time that pragmatic reality may not be the essence of reality (though seems to be some part of it at least). What if the most prevalent essences of reality are simply too much for us as we are to be able to function and handle the load? This is a bit of an appeal to the proposed functions and natures of heuristics and cognitive biases; to filter information in a way that allows us to act more quickly and fluidly. The question still stands all the same. If it is the case that we experience and receive more of the appearance of reality than we do of reality as it “actually” is, then what certainty do we have? However, and also, how do we ascertain that we are receiving the appearance of reality more than the actuality of reality if we never experience the totality of the actuality of reality to have a metric in which to make this assertion from?

Hume stated that all we have are impressions of things and not things in and of themselves, and these things may not exist at all. Impressions here is remarkably similar to appearances in the above. Bear in mind, it was Hume who, viciously and quite accurately, pointed out a great many things in the faults of what we feel we know and are certain of, invalidating fundamental objects of our thought-to-be perception in the undercurrents of our thinking such as cause and effect (we infer causal links; problem of induction), continuity (related to causation; contiguity, succession, and conjunction), and space and time (argument against infinite divisibility). It's hard to say that he thought or believed anything actually existed: just impressions and nothingness... Not even a mind, for it's never been observed empirically and it's something that we assume (as is also the case with cause and effect, the idea of continuity, and space and time; things that cannot be empirically observed in and of themselves and represent constructs that allow us to move through whatever this is [life]). They are all things that we infer and not observe.

All the same, he did also observe that despite being aware of this, one is unlikely to be deterred in their day-to-day experience and operation. This is likely due to the very particular point that his arguments are about what and how we come to know, with certainty and the assumptions and inferences we make in place of more empirical ways of coming to knowledge; through observation (and our limits in and of our observational capacities) . It's not to say that all else fails, quite the contrary, it is actually sufficient. That is all however, just sufficient for moving through the “world” and “life.” It may not be the “knowledge” and “certainty” we think it is.

For Kant (who was responding to Hume), and connecting a little more with the Hindu usage (in the sense that there is a definite claim that something lies “underneath” the illusion or phenomena we perceive),we never experience the true essence of anything in and of itself. Instead of impressions, Kant said that we experience the phenomena of a thing, but the essence of a thing in and of itself is forever veiled to us due to all sense data and ideation we receive from the phenomena of a thing. When we are able to strip all of these things away, we then have the noumena, or a thing in and of itself, of which nothing can be said...

We're stepping out of Plato's cave... (Allegory of the Cave)

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Been busy, overwhelmed and scatter-brained... but here's a little bit of our next section.



I tend to consider Stoicism the Greek Buddhism (and visa versa)

A paradigm that our behavior can map onto given where we have led ourselves throughout our skeptical journey.

Stoicism posits that the best way for the human organism to exist and live the best life is through that of adherence to virtue which can be found through acquired necessary knowledge and living in harmony with the higher order of nature(or divine reason).

When we are unable to specify and delineate what we feel we know we are able to remove ourselves from certain kinds of judgments, often binary in nature, and we can see the multifaceted potential, we can exercise indifference in most things.

This indifference lends itself to the implementation of suspension of judgment of its own kind. This suspension is positivist, but with regard to what it refers to, reaches the same destination. Simply, nothing is inherently good or bad to the stoic, and such ideas are a matter of context and preference. The stoic suspends their judgment about anything being good or bad aside from appropriate virtues, which are always good. For the skeptic, it doesn't seem that anything can be known to be good or bad.

For both ideals, application is much harder than developing and stating the ideals.

It however, seems to become easier with practice and particular attention to practicing acceptance specifically. Say, hypothetically, that we can come to the one source of information that can be known is that nothing can be known (paradox). Well what then? Humans, appearing to be how we seem to be, will revolt against “the one thing” that can be known, removing themselves from that one “truth” will develop all sorts and kinds of systems to explain the world, existence, and apparent experience of it. It's a fight against the inevitable at this point in the present hypothetical situation, futile. Acceptance is the only way out. And not out of the situation of potential unknowability, but instead out of the disgruntled state about such a conclusion.

To be continued...

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Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness





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Sharing a study that highlights how the structure of social networks influences perspectives of various kinds of information and how it rarely relies on the person's position more than that of the group. The implications show that we accept many ideas as a result of popularity more so than being good or true. It lends itself to the knowledge one feels or thinks they have...

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Oof the Door Study and selective attention test videos are humbling, as in, I feel vulnerable and wonder how many times I've personally missed the gorilla in life.

Also, makes me think "politics", maybe always, but now more so than ever with exponentially greater range of potential distractions every day.

Thanks for sharing!

Hahaha! Those ones are good. I shared them to influence reflection on how our faculties to derive "knowledge" may likely need be constant if we ever want to approach certainty. But such constant management and scrutiny may not be possible...

I was reintroduced to the videos through a series of lectures I listened to on epistemology, wherein the professor was trying to put forth an idea of externalism. While the lectures had really good information, I found it to be poor philosophy. I feel less defeated by not being able to do the kind of work academically

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